October War US Documents: ’’Israel’’ Could Produce, Use Small Numbers of Nuclear Weapons

Local Editor

During the 1973 War, "Israel" could produce "small numbers" of nuclear weapons. After the conflict, U.S. intelligence estimated that the balance of conventional weaponry was in the Arabs' favor, so "Israel" would consider threatening them with nuclear weapons, and possibly even using them.

Such details can be found in documents on the 1973 Arab-"Israeli" war, classified until Thursday's release by the U.S. State Department's history division. The information is found in a publication known as "Foreign Relations of the United States."
 
The nearly 1,300 pages describe the October war and the efforts to end it. Even though many of the details about "Israel's" political, military and intelligence failures in the war are known, the release of the documents adds an official seal to many uncomfortable facts. For example, the documents challenge "Israel's" nuclear ambiguity.
 
"On November 27, 1973, about a month after the war, Nixon and Kissinger met with congressional leaders. The leader of the Democratic majority in the Senate, Mike Mansfield, asked: "Do Egypt and "Israel" have the capability to make nuclear weapons?" the document reveals.

Kissinger replied: " "Israel" has the capability to make small numbers. Not Egypt. And we don't think the Soviets have put them in. Should "Israel" brandish nuclear weapons, the Soviets would counter it and it would be very dangerous for "Israel"."
On the final day of the war, October 24, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency issued a negative assessment about "Israel's" ability to beat Arab armies in the future.
 
"However well they come out of the present conflict, the "Israelis" can no longer be confident of quick, decisive victories in the future," wrote the DIA analysts, who had mistakenly believed several months earlier that the "Israeli" army would easily defeat the Arab armies.
 
According to the assessment, the "Israeli" army was no longer enough to assure "Israel's" security in the future.
 
"Among the options are: an international guarantee of "Israel's" borders; a unilateral U.S. military guarantee of those borders; or a public declaration of "Israeli" determination to employ nuclear weapons to guarantee its territorial integrity," the analysts wrote.
 
The last option, according to the Pentagon's assessment, relied on the assumption "that "Israel" has or is soon to acquire nuclear weapons," and that "Israel" would seek to deter future Arab attacks by "their threatened use against such targets as Arab forces, cities, ports, holy places, and the Aswan High Dam could serve to deter future armed attacks."

The assessment continues by saying that "such an avowed "Israeli" policy would occasion world-wide opposition. The U.S. would, therefore, find it extremely difficult to associate itself with such an "Israeli" policy. Meanwhile, the Arabs might be willing to attack, despite the deterrent threat. They might assume that (1) "Israel" will not carry out the threat, (2) they could succeed even if the "Israelis" used nuclear weapons, perhaps with the aid of other unconventional means of their own such as chemical or biological weapons, or (3) they would reap important benefits from the resultant international reaction should "Israel" carry out its threat."
 

Source : "Haaretz" "Israeli" Newspaper