2006 War Humiliation Prevails ’’Israel’s’’ Military
Under the title "THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict between Hizbullah and "Israel" Could Look and How Both Sides Are Preparing for It", Brookings Institute published an August analysis paper that came into the following conclusion:
"Neither Hizbullah nor "Israel" believes that the 2006 conflict will be the last battle waged between them, and both sides have been feverishly preparing for the next war ever since the last one ended."
The analysis started from the results of the "Israeli" July- August 2006 war against Lebanon:
""Israel" suffered the humiliation of underestimating its foe, and achieved none of its overly ambitious war goals. The "IDF's" poor performance on multiple levels-leadership, coordination, logistics, and fighting capabilities-undermined "Israel's" much prized deterrent factor, and led to the perception of defeat."
Hizbullah Ready:
Stating that "the level of Hizbullah's military performance stunned "Israel", surprised the rest of the world, and allowed its leadership to proclaim a "divine victory" against its enemy," Brookings analysis adds that "Hizbullah's survival allowed it to control the political process in Beirut, enhance its image and popularity in the Arab world, and attract more followers in the region."
In their analysis, the two analysts Bilal Y. Saab and Nicholas Blanford revealed that "since the end of the 2006 war, Hizbullah has undergone the largest recruitment and training drive in its thirty-year history, swelling its ranks with dedicated cadres and reviving its former multi-sectarian reservist units."
"In terms of weapons procurement, Hizbullah has focused on acquiring long-range rockets fitted with guidance systems to target a list of specific military and infrastructure sites in Israel. Hizbullah also is believed to have received training on more advanced air defense systems that could pose an increased threat to low-flying "Israeli" air assets, such as helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles," the study added.
"With the support of Iran, Hizbullah has made further advances in its signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications capabilities. Hizbullah is expected to use these upgraded weapons and SIGINT capabilities to play an offensive role in a future conflict with "Israel", attempting to seize the initiative, rather than adopting the reactive and defensive posture of 2006," the Saab and Blanford mentions.
Stressing Hizbullah's readiness for the any time coming war, the analysis claims that "among the new battle plans being prepared by Hizbullah are land and seaborne insertions into "Israel" to carry out commando-style raids."
"Given the range of the missiles in Hizbullah's possession, the battle space in the next war will likely be larger than the traditional theater of southern Lebanon and northern "Israel", encompassing large portions of both countries," the US strategic analysis adds.
Reiterating the speeches of Hizbullah's Secretary General His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah over the past three years, the study points out that His Eminence "has warned "Israel" that Hizbullah has the ability to inflict devastating blows against "Israel" on land and at sea in response to an "Israeli" attack on Lebanon."
Revealing that "Hizbullah has expanded in size, installed sophisticated communications equipment for better coordination, strengthened its defenses, and rebuilt its command and control structure," the military analysis views that "it has procured intelligence on strategic targets inside "Israel" and integrated offensive strategies into its overall doctrine of deterrence."
Moving to the Intelligence level, the study uncovers Hizbullah mastery of the field.
"In terms of specific communications upgrades, Hizbullah's fiber-optic network has expanded since 2006 and now covers almost all the areas in which its forces are deployed," it says.
"Since at least 2000, Hizbullah, using public resources as well as networks of spies inside "Israel", has amassed a comprehensive database of Israeli civilian and military infrastructure that can be targeted in the event of war," the analysis notes acknowledging that " because Hizbullah's intelligence has become finer tuned, "Israeli" analyst Amir Kulick has argued that the next war between "Israel" and Hizbullah is likely to be more difficult and complex, especially in everything concerning "Israel's" rear (the region between Haifa and Tel Aviv)."
"The preparation of a systematic database covering Israel's rear in conjunction with improved fire capabilities significantly raises the probability that in the next war not only will "Israeli" population centers be exposed to harm but so will installations and infrastructures in the heart of the country, " Saad and Blanford highlights before coming to the following conclusions:
- Hizbullah did more than acquire upgraded armaments after the 2006 war, it embarked upon the largest recruitment and training drive in its thirty year history.
- In the next war, "Israeli" territory could become a front line for the first time since 1948
- From a military point of view, Hizbullah is much more powerful and resilient today than it was in 2006.
2006 Defeat, the Continuous "Israeli" Nightmare
At the "Israeli" level, "Brooking" study pointed out that "Israel" also has been busy implementing the lessons it learned from 2006 in preparation for the possibility of another conflict with Hizbullah."
""Israel's" military and political leaderships were ill prepared for a large-scale war with Hizbullah in 2006. Moreover, lack of proper coordination between the military and political leaderships led to strategic mistakes, including an excessive reliance on air power and a late and half-hearted decision to commit ground troops," the study notes.
Emphasizing that "Israel" failed to stop Hizbullah barrage of short and medium-range rockets against "Israeli" targets throughout the duration of the war, the analysis regards that the reservist troops had received insufficient training to cope with the hybrid fighting technique employed by Hizbullah."
"The logistical chain between the front line and the rear was badly coordinated, which meant troops often ran short of basic needs, such as water and ammunition. Poor intelligence prior during the war prevented the "IDF" from knowing the exact locations of Hizbullah's sophisticated and camouflaged bunkers," it adds.
"In short, the "IDF" suffered from both an inability to execute its own strategy and answer Hizbullah's," the analysts stress.
Uncovering that the Southern villages still form "Israel's" most devastating nightmare, Saad and Blanford explain that "the first challenging urban environment to "Israel's" military would be Bint Jbeil, which has great strategic and symbolic value to both sides."
"The "IDF" has painful memories of Bint Jbeil. During the Web of Steel operation in 2006, the elite infantry Golani Brigade lost eight soldiers in a Hizbullah ambush along the town's outskirts. The fierce battle for Bint Jbeil forced "Israel" to pull its ground troops out of the Lebanese town, giving Hizbullah a huge morale boost," the analysis goes on.
Mentioning the some of the military lessons "Israel" learned from 2006 defeat, the study recognizes some of the new measures in the "Israeli" army.
"The "IDF" has instituted greater logistical autonomy and sustainability in its combat units, and has strengthened the ability of its ground forces, navy, and air force to carry out joint operations. It also has trained extensively in large-scale ground operations, employing rapid maneuver techniques and using more robust and flexible equipment to reduce tactical vulnerability," the study clarifies.
As the study notes the fact that "Israeli" leaders are unified in recognizing the serious challenge posed by Hizbullah, it further stresses that "there is a lack of unanimity on how to deal with the threat."
In response to its 2006 defeat, the paper reports that "the "Israeli" military created several urban warfare centers shortly after the 2006 war, the largest of which, the Urban Warfare Training Center (UWTC), simulates a variety of Lebanese villages, towns, and refugee camps."
In the same context, the study doubts "the efficiency of new technologies including a multi-tiered missile shield to intercept and destroy Hizbullah's short-range and long-range weapons and Iran's ballistic missiles as well as the "Trophy" defense system to protect Tanks against anti-armor projectiles."
"How these new systems cope in a war situation and with Hizbullah's rocket barrages and anti-armor tactics remains to be seen," the study comments.
"Despite the "IDF's" extensive military preparations, "Israel" still faces formidable challenges in another confrontation with Hizbullah, and its options are less than perfect. A concerted attempt to smash Hizbullah's military capabilities once and for all... offers no guarantees of success."
The Brookings study shed lights on the consequences of the expected war between "Israel" and Hizbullah not on the war parties only but on the entire region:
"Indeed, given Hizbullah's extensive military preparations and "Israel's" pattern of using heavy force in conflicts, the next war will likely be of a magnitude, lethality, and scope that would make the 2006 conflict pale in comparison. Because of its expected scale, the next war could easily spiral out of control and involve Iran, Syria, and other states or sub-state actors in the region. Indeed, the next war may end up being a "transformational" event in the Middle East," the analysis predicts.
The two military analysts Blanford and Saab point out that "another large-scale "Israeli" military campaign against Hizbullah that fails in its objectives would probably enhance Iran's strategic foothold in the region and strengthen its bargaining position in its negotiations with the West over its nuclear enrichment program."
"Although it appears that "Israel" has not yet formulated a coherent policy for dealing with Hizbullah, top "Israeli" military strategists recognize that the task of decisively defeating the Lebanese group is a near impossibility," the US study concludes.
Source: Brookings Institute
