The Gaza-South Lebanon parallel …(1)

author: Hasan Abu Nimah, 03 March 2004
source: Jordan Times, 3-3-2004
summary: IN 1999, "Israel" quickly reached the conclusion that it should leave south Lebanon. The so-called security zone, which "Israel" decided to keep under occupation after its invading army`s withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983, had turned to be more of a security burden rather than the intended security buffer for the "Israeli" northern border.
Over the years, "Israeli" casualties mounted as the Lebanese resistance was getting tougher and too fierce to defeat.‏
The Lebanese official position, as well as that of the resistance forces led by Hizbullah, was that the resistance was legitimate and would continue so long as the occupation of the south did.‏
In order to cut its human losses, and as a result of its failure to deal with the situation by resorting to the use of force, any amount of force, the last option left for "Israel" was to withdraw from south Lebanon. The matter was not that simple, though.‏
Many "Israelis" feared that any unilateral withdrawal decision would hand Hizbullah and the Lebanese resistance an easy victory. But apart from that particular concern, "Israel" had deeper worries; it did not want to sound weak and defeated, and it did not want that impression to encourage the Lebanese resistance to increase its pressure by threatening "Israelis" across the border, inside "Israel", once they moved closer to that border. Such concerns needed to be dealt with in advance of any evacuation move.‏
Towards that end, "Israel" approached the United Nations to use the unimplemented Security Council Resolution 425 as cover. It was not the intention of "Israel" just to negotiate with the UN the implementation of the 28-year-old resolution. What the "Israelis" sought was to engage Lebanon in negotiations aiming at reaching security guarantees for their northern border, including the removal of Hizbullah from the south and the deployment of the official Lebanese army there, once the "Israeli" forces had left.‏
The Lebanese government refused to engage in any form of negotiation on that basis, insisting that it was "Israel"`s duty to implement the resolution without any justification for Lebanese involvement. In the end, that was the result. The "Israeli" forces` hasty withdrawal in June 2000, ahead of the set date, had to happen without removing Hizbullah from the south, or suppressing the spreading view that "Israel" did indeed retreat under the devastating blows of the Lebanese resistance and acted from a position of undisguisable weakness.‏
Recently, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon surprised everyone when he declared that Gaza was not the place for Jews to be there permanently, and as a result, all 17 Jewish settlements there would be dismantled, leaving just one or two located across the "Israeli" border, at the northern tip of Gaza Strip. Although there were all kinds of doubts and interpretations as to the real motives behind Sharon`s declaration, one reality remained obvious: the settlements in Gaza have turned to be not only a huge security burden on "Israel" but also one of the ugliest faces of an ongoing and cruel occupation.‏
As was the case in Lebanon three years earlier, "Israel" had to cut down its losses and abandon Gaza but, and again as was the case with Lebanon, without leaving Gaza for a "victorious" Hamas, and without looking defeated and weak. To address the latter concern, the Sharon government has been escalating its violence against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and elsewhere, probably to disguise any apparent weakness associated with the settlement removal decision. In addition, Sharon has been pressing the claim which must be his real goal - that he was not actually removing settlements but relocating them in the West Bank.‏
The other concern, leaving Gaza for Hamas, seems to be a much greater worry for "Israel" than anything else. There were earlier "Israeli" offers to hand Gaza over to the Palestinian National Authority, to make it a "security model" by dismantling the resistance groups, particularly Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The PNA opposed the plan for obvious reasons. Presently, the prospects of trying to establish any real authority of the PNA in Gaza, once the "Israelis" have left, seem very uncertain.‏
The other option, of leaving the "Israeli" army in control in Gaza after the removal of the settlers, as some "Israeli" military leaders have indicated, looks neither practical nor wise; it will make the situation worse, making soldiers, instead of civilians, legitimate targets in the line of resistance fire.‏
Probably it is the absence of any other option that the idea of inviting Egypt back into Gaza came to the "Israeli" mind. It is obvious that Egypt`s return would provide the best assurance for "Israel" that the evacuated land would be left under the good control of a responsible state, and from that, "Israel" will certainly stand to benefit. But neither this, nor any other consideration should block the way of the "Israeli" departure.‏
The current "Israeli" dilemma with regard to the withdrawal from Gaza may compare well with the situation in the south of Lebanon, but Gaza is different, and it will be much more difficult for "Israel" to leave it the way it left Lebanon. Some arrangements here may be inevitable.‏
The ideal situation is for the Palestinians to take over. But if that is not possible under the present circumstances, why should an interim Egyptian role not be considered, provided the right conditions are guaranteed?‏
The right conditions should require a full "Israeli" withdrawal of all soldiers and dismantling of all settlements, along with an "Israeli" guarantee that no settlers will be reimplanted in the West Bank. An interim Egyptian presence could help the Palestinians there build an efficient and corruption-free administration of their own, a mini-government that could help people recover from the pain and the severe suffering under occupation. Once freed from the "Israeli" attacks and daily incursions, they could build their demolished dwellings, as well as their shattered society. They could return to normal life, and with Arab and foreign financial aid, they could also build their economy and free themselves of dependence on "Israel" for employment. They could, with Egyptian help, create the right model (not the "Israeli" model) for what should happen in the West Bank next.‏
The success of such a project would most certainly require a voluntary commitment from all factions there to banning all forms of violence against the "Israelis". That would render any call for dismantling resistance organizations baseless, since they set the right example, proving that the end of occupation truly means the end of violence. "Israel" would be under great pressure to reciprocate.‏
There is no reason why such an arrangement should not be viewed as a reformed and liberated portion of the future Palestinian state, and not as a separated rival to the PNA or a challenge to its authority. PNA supporters in Gaza could join the democratic process of building the Gaza administration, but they should not have a divine right to control it undemocratically. Even when the Palestinians will have their own state on all the occupied territories in Gaza and the West Bank, Gaza will inevitably stay as a separate administrative unit within the state.‏