“Israeli” Military October 7 Probe: Gaza Division Defeated in 2 Hours
By Staff, Agencies
“Israeli” investigations into October 7's al-Aqsa Flood Operation have exposed critical failures within the military and intelligence apparatus of the “Israeli” occupation, with findings revealing a series of grave miscalculations, operational lapses, and command breakdowns.
A report by “Yedioth Ahronoth” daily concluded that “Israeli” military intelligence suffered from "arrogance and blindness”, failing to anticipate the scale of the attack. The investigation found that Hamas initially planned to launch the offensive during Passover in 2023 but postponed it to enhance preparedness.
In the months leading up to the attack, the “Israeli” occupation forces' [IOF] Southern Command assessed that the worst-case scenario would involve the infiltration of around 70 armed fighters through two points along the Gaza border. However, reality far exceeded expectations as around 5,000 Hamas fighters breached “Israeli” defenses.
The military's misjudgment was compounded by the entity’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's directive three months before the attack, instructing the IOF to prioritize threats from Iran, Hezbollah, and the West Bank while maintaining calm in Gaza. This shift in focus left “Israeli” forces unprepared for the unprecedented assault.
Investigations revealed that the Gaza Division collapsed for several hours during the attack, and this reality was not fully grasped in real-time, leading to delays in decision-making at the Southern Command and General Staff levels. The chain of command suffered a "fundamental blow," preventing a swift operational response.
The Palestinian Resistance exploited this disarray, launching attacks through land, air, and sea:
On the ground, around 5,500 Palestinian fighters entered occupied Palestinian territory in three waves, breaking through 114 crossing points and advancing via 59 attack routes toward southern and central “Israeli” settlements.
On the naval level, seven boats carrying some 50 fighters attempted to penetrate “Israel’s” coastal defenses. In the air, Hamas deployed 63 aircraft, including 57 drones and six motorized paragliders, catching the “Israeli” Air Force off guard.
Despite the military’s ongoing internal probes, the “Israeli” domestic security agency, the “Shin Bet”, is yet to disclose the findings of its own investigation into the intelligence failures.
Recent reports indicate that there had been minimal cooperation by the “Shin Bet” with the IOF's investigations, which raised further concerns about accountability and the accuracy of the probes, as well as any details that might be missing due to the Shin Bet withholding critical information.
The Resistance's operation dealt a severe blow to the “Israeli” occupation forces within the first few hours, as the Gaza Division was effectively defeated within two hours. Additionally, most mid-level commanders, including battalion and company leaders, were killed in the early stages.
On top of the staggering losses, the commanders of three brigades were also eliminated, making for a total of 157 “Israeli” soldiers killed in the first three hours.
“Israeli” newspaper Walla! reported that Hamas targeted the air bases of the “Israeli” Air Force with heavy rocket fire, disrupting takeoffs, which subsequently caused further confusion in terms of the military response.
A separate investigation by “Maariv” described the “Israeli” occupation forces' military performance on October 7 as "a historic and unprecedented failure." A senior “Israeli” military official admitted, "The investigations into the events of October 7 do not provide satisfactory explanations."
“Maariv” commented on the report saying the “Israeli” Gaza Division was defeated in the first two hours of the war by Hamas.
For his part, “Yedioth Ahronoth's” military analyst Ron Ben-Yishai said earlier in February that Israeli air defenses had shown "absolute blindness, arrogance, and an underestimation of the enemy," after October 7.
In a recent op-ed, Ben-Yishai cited an investigation revealing that the “Israeli” Security Ministry in “Kirya” did not recognize where the attack was coming from, rather believing "Israel" was experiencing a multi-front operation. Therefore, most warplanes were sent to the occupied north to protect sensitive sites.
The occupied south, on the other hand, was exposed after the security officials failed to assess the situation, thereby instructing warplanes not to attack settlements and sites, he added.
Furthermore, the investigation, which includes over a thousand pages of findings, indicated that the air defenses "were at full efficiency during the first few minutes of the attack."
According to Ben-Yishai, the preceding political dispute, in which reserve pilots were involved, did not impact the Air Force's activity. "The failure stemmed from a different place," he stated.
"The primary failure that prevented the Air Force from fully deploying its capabilities in the early hours of the attack was the flawed assessment of the threat by the Military Intelligence Directorate [Aman] and the internal security agency [Shin Bet], as well as the Air Force’s inadequate preparedness for the required state of alert," according to Ben-Yishai.
