Monopoly of Arms in Lebanon: What Kind of State Do They Want?

By Ali Abbadi
For years, Lebanon has been divided between two camps over the issue of “state monopoly over arms”.
One camp argues that exclusive control of arms by the state is essential to restoring sovereignty. This view typically rejects armed resistance as a legitimate means of liberating occupied land or defending against “Israeli” aggression. It is closely aligned with the pro-Western bloc, which maintains that the Resistance and the state are inherently incompatible. Some in this camp even anticipate—if not now, then eventually—establishing relations with the “Israeli” occupation entity, in line with the wave of normalization sweeping the region under direct US sponsorship. They also claim that armed resistance is incompatible with tourism, prosperity and the attraction of foreign investment.
The opposing camp, represented by Hezbollah and its allies, argues that before the state can demand a monopoly on arms, it must first achieve genuine sovereignty—meaning independence in decision-making and the ability to protect its people from external aggression. Without these conditions, the demand becomes little more than a formality serving foreign agendas. How can a state be sovereign if it takes directives from outside its institutions—such as the current government adopting a pre-packaged US security plan without internal dialogue? And how can it insist on exclusive control of arms when it cannot even shield its citizens from foreign threats?
This group advocates a model that integrates Lebanon’s defense and economic interests, rather than the fragile, one-dimensional approach that has historically failed in moments of crisis—especially given the constant “Israeli” threat. They ask: If the enemy can sustain economic growth in a war-based society, why can’t we do the same?
The American Context
Amid this debate, the plan proposed by US envoy Tom Barrack seeks to impose a timetable and set of priorities clearly aligned with “Israeli” interests and the broader US regional agenda—namely, the disarmament of the Resistance in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria and Iraq—while undermining Lebanon’s sovereignty.
The real question is not simply whether the state should have a monopoly on arms, but which arms and which state will hold them.
Since the liberation of South Lebanon in 2000 and the Resistance’s steadfastness during the 2006 “Israeli” aggression, a deterrence balance has existed through the complementary relationship between the army and the Resistance.
The new narrative seeks to dismantle this balance, portraying the Resistance as incompatible with the state, and betting on the claim that “state logic” cannot coexist with a Resistance that supports the army against “Israeli” or any external aggression.
Key Provisions of the American Plan
- Disarm Hezbollah and other Resistance factions as the first step.
- Redirect the Lebanese army inward, focusing on tracking down Resistance arms instead of defending borders.
- Establish an international intelligence-surveillance network involving US and French drones and satellites, under the pretext of verifying the dismantling of the Resistance’s military infrastructure.
The plan specifically targets advanced weapons—ballistic missiles, drones and air-defense systems—which Barrack claims “threaten ‘Israel’”. The underlying aim is clear: to ensure “Israel” remains the sole dominant power in Lebanon and the region, in line with ongoing efforts to deprive neighboring countries of strategic weaponry.
That Barrack presented this proposal so openly raises serious questions about Lebanese sovereignty. Why wasn’t it delivered indirectly, allowing the government to frame it as its own? Why did Washington insist on publicizing it in its own name, demanding adoption as-is—more like signing a surrender agreement than engaging in a cabinet “discussion”?
Was this due to a lack of trust in the Lebanese authorities—requiring strict instructions and leaving no room for local negotiation? Or was it simply to make clear that the final say lies with the US, leaving no time for internal dialogue on the Resistance’s arms, as proposed by the President?
Are the Americans and “Israelis” in a rush to push Lebanon toward normalization? Is this plan intended to stir domestic turmoil as a distraction from an American-“Israeli” scheme to forcibly displace Gaza’s population? And how does this fit into Washington’s wider campaign to disarm Resistance movements across the region?
Critical Observations
Several concerns stand out in the “arms monopoly” push:
- Skewed Priorities: Disarmament is placed ahead of halting “Israeli” aggression or securing withdrawal from occupied territories. If empowering the state were the real goal, priority would go to reclaiming border points, stopping daily violations and freeing Lebanese detainees—steps that would actually strengthen the government. The current approach reveals a bias toward the occupation’s agenda.
- Compromising Security Autonomy: Embedding foreign surveillance in the Lebanese army erodes its independence. The plan changes the army’s core mission from protecting borders to policing Resistance arms, subjecting it to external oversight—a view long promoted by "Israel".
- Marginalized Role in the Quintet Committee: This ceasefire-born committee, heavily US–“Israeli”-directed, has ignored Lebanese complaints about violations for eight consecutive months. Lebanon plays a passive role rather than an active one.
- Sovereignty for Sale: Tying financial aid or reconstruction to political conditions undermines decision-making. History shows such promises are often unreliable, creating a trade-off between sovereignty and economic relief.
- Implementation Challenges: Cabinet approval is easier than actual enforcement, which requires political consensus—currently absent.
- Imposed Deadlines: Setting end-of-year deadlines pressures a divided government with no protection guarantees.
- Violation of Airspace: Opening skies to foreign surveillance serves “Israeli” intelligence aims.
- Security Risks: “Israel” could exploit the decision as a pretext for further aggression or to justify continued occupation.
Possible Consequences
This process is clearly driven by external pressure rather than a Lebanese initiative. The absence of national consensus could lead to major political instability.
Forces are pushing Lebanon toward deeper concessions—ultimately toward submission to US–“Israeli” demands and integration into the “Abraham Accords”. This is despite the fact that Lebanon can strengthen sovereignty while still utilizing the Resistance’s defensive capabilities.
Given the imbalance of power with “Israel”, Lebanon needs a defense model that integrates the army with an armed, resilient society—something already practiced in both the Zionist entity and the US. In the former, settlers are armed; in the latter, the Second Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” as part of “a well-regulated militia… necessary to the security of a free state”.
Critics of Barrack’s vision warn that it offers no path to genuine sovereignty. Instead, it seeks to redefine the army’s role, dismantle Lebanon’s defense system, and impose political and economic burdens that the country cannot meet—setting the stage for new normalization deals in the region.