Violence Against the Druze in Syria: Sectarian Strife and Strategic Calculations

By Mohamad Hammoud

Lebanon – The recent wave of violence against Syria’s Druze community highlights the country’s deepening sectarian crisis under Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani – a former member of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham [HTS]. Since assuming power, al-Sharaa has struggled to assert national control amid a landscape fractured by political instability, sectarian divisions, and the reemergence of extremist groups. The latest violence was sparked by an audio clip allegedly insulting the Prophet Mohammad [PBUH]—falsely attributed to a Druze cleric. Though quickly debunked by both the cleric and Syrian authorities, the recording gave Sunni extremists a pretext to launch coordinated attacks on Druze areas, triggering a series of deadly confrontations.

Sectarian Fault Lines and Distrust

This eruption of violence cannot be viewed in isolation. It is rooted in longstanding mistrust between the Druze community and the central government. The Druze, a religious minority with a tradition of autonomy and political caution, have historically kept their distance from the state. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the Druze sought limited integration into the emerging post-Assad order—requesting localized policing, cultural recognition, and institutional guarantees. However, progress was slow, and negotiations stalled. President al-Sharaa’s Islamist background only reinforced Druze suspicions, deepening an already frayed relationship.

In February 2025, clashes broke out in areas like Jaramana—a suburb of Damascus known for its mixed Druze and Christian population. These confrontations between Druze militias and government forces resulted in casualties on both sides. Human rights organizations have reported extrajudicial killings of Druze civilians by pro-government units, exacerbating tensions and reinforcing fears of targeted repression.

Strategic Value of Suwayda

While the violence is undoubtedly sectarian in nature, it is also deeply strategic. Suwayda province, the cultural and political heartland of Syria’s Druze community, borders both Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. For Damascus, retaining control of Suwayda is essential—not only for the integrity of the state but also to prevent the rise of foreign-backed insurgencies in the south. However, the creation of the Suwayda Military Council, a Druze-led force supported by local leaders and militias, has established a parallel authority that directly challenges Damascus’s claims to legitimacy. This council has become both a symbol and an instrument of Druze resistance, further complicating the government's efforts to reassert control.

"Israel" and the Druze: Strategic Intervention

The escalating crisis has drawn regional powers into the fray, most notably "Israel". With a domestic Druze population exceeding 100,000 and an additional 20,000 in the Golan Heights, "Israel" has both internal political pressures and strategic calculations driving its involvement. In response to reported massacres, "Israel" launched targeted airstrikes against Syrian military installations near Damascus, claiming its actions were meant to protect the Druze minority from government reprisals.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly demanded the demilitarization of southern Syria and issued a stark warning that "Israel" would not stand idly by in the face of threats to Druze communities. These moves, however, were met with swift condemnation. Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt accused "Israel" of exploiting the crisis to further entrench itself in Syrian affairs. The Syrian government also denounced the airstrikes as clear violations of sovereignty and international law.

But beyond the rhetoric of humanitarian concern, “Israel’s” actions align with a well-established regional strategy. The so-called “periphery doctrine”—an effort to build strategic alliances with minorities across the Middle East—appears to be reemerging. Just as "Israel" previously aligned itself with Maronite Christians in Lebanon and Kurds in Iraq, it now appears to be cultivating ties with the Druze. The aim is not merely to offer protection, but to establish loyal buffer zones that dilute the threat posed by any future unified Syrian state. Increasingly, there is evidence that "Israel" supports the fragmentation of Syria into semi-autonomous regions—perhaps three or more de facto governments—thereby ensuring that a consolidated, hostile regime cannot reconstitute itself near "Israel’s" borders.

Turkey’s Subtle Positioning

While not directly involved in the Druze conflict, Turkey remains a key player in the new Syrian government. It maintains a substantial military presence in northern Syria and continues efforts to expand its regional influence. Recent agreements between Ankara and the al-Sharaa administration have brought the two governments into closer alignment—yet also placed Turkey in direct strategic competition with “Israel”.

Reports of Turkish and “Israeli” aircraft operating in overlapping airspace underscore the growing friction and convergence of their regional ambitions.

Turkey strongly supports the preservation of Syria’s territorial unity, largely to prevent the emergence of Kurdish autonomy, which it considers a major national security threat. Accordingly, Ankara is wary of any moves toward fragmentation, including in Druze-majority areas of the south. While publicly disengaged from the Druze crisis, Turkey is closely watching its evolution, aware that instability could spill over and threaten its southern border.

Conclusion

The violence against the Druze is not merely a reflection of sectarian animosity—it signals the Syrian state’s deeper failure to build a unified, inclusive political framework in the post-Assad era. Al-Sharaa’s inability to forge meaningful reconciliation with minority groups, disband militia networks, and restore trust in central institutions has allowed the country’s fragmentation to accelerate.

Regional powers such as "Israel" and Turkey, each pursuing their own strategic objectives, have found opportunity in this chaos. Without a genuine commitment to minority rights and inclusive governance, southern Syria will remain trapped in a volatile cycle of violence and foreign interference.