Tom Barrack in Lebanon: Surprising US Flexibility to Safeguard Syrian–‘Israeli’ Peace Talks
By Jamal Wakim
Lebanon – The visit of US special envoy Tom Barrack to Beirut marked a notable development in the Lebanese political scene—not only for its direct diplomatic messages, but also for the underlying signals indicating a tactical shift in Washington’s approach to a highly sensitive issue: Hezbollah’s armament.
It became clear that the traditionally firm and pressure-heavy American tone had suddenly given way to an unexpected degree of flexibility. This was reflected in the characterization of Hezbollah’s weapons as an “internal Lebanese issue”—a rare expression in the American diplomatic lexicon regarding this subject.
This shift cannot be separated from the broader regional context, particularly the serious negotiations currently underway in Damascus between the new Syrian leadership, headed by Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the “Israeli” side.
These talks are progressing rapidly, driven by a shared interest in reaching a “comprehensive peace” agreement that would end decades of both direct and indirect conflict and tension between the two sides.
In this context, the United States—which has long pursued a comprehensive settlement in the “Middle East”—appears deeply invested in these negotiations, viewing them as a rare opportunity for a strategic breakthrough in the region’s political and security landscape.
From this angle, the American flexibility in Lebanon can be interpreted as part of a broader tactical approach aimed at avoiding any escalation or disturbance on the Lebanese front that could jeopardize the course of the Syrian–“Israeli” talks.
Washington seemingly wants to prevent the outbreak of a new front in Lebanon—one in which Hezbollah could be used by regional actors to sabotage the peace process or to bolster their negotiating leverage.
It is likely that US policymakers have concluded that resolving the issue of Hezbollah’s arms is neither feasible nor urgent at this stage. Instead, they appear inclined to postpone addressing the matter until after a Syrian–“Israeli” peace agreement is reached.
Such an agreement, if finalized, would inevitably reshape regional alliances and calculations. It would likely lead to the gradual weakening of the foundations of the “Resistance Axis”—especially if the deal includes security and economic guarantees for Syria, along with political recognition of the new regime in Damascus.
As for Lebanon, the Americans appear to be gambling on a dual scenario: On one hand, if Syria enters into formal peace with “Israel,” the Lebanese resistance would lose one of its main sources of regional and strategic backing. On the other hand, this would allow for the activation of internal mechanisms—political and possibly even security-related—to pressure Hezbollah toward disarmament. This could occur either through internationally supported domestic agreements or, in the event of Hezbollah’s refusal, by fostering conditions that may lead to internal confrontation. In such a case, the objective of “restoring state sovereignty” would be invoked as a justification for potential military action.
This reading presents two parallel outcomes: Either a regional deal materializes, leading to significant shifts in the balance of power and prompting Hezbollah to gradually reposition itself in political and security terms; or, regional and domestic pressures accumulate to the point of causing a violent rupture, dragging Lebanon once again into internal conflict.
In either case, it seems that the United States has opted to postpone any direct confrontation with Hezbollah until the outcome of the Damascus negotiations becomes clear—talks that could ultimately redefine the rules of the game across the entire region.
In conclusion, Tom Barrack’s apparent flexibility does not indicate a fundamental shift in America’s position toward Hezbollah. Rather, it reflects a situational strategy aimed at avoiding disruptions to what Washington currently considers a higher strategic priority: the Syrian–“Israeli” peace process. However, what follows that peace—if achieved—may look very different from everything that came before.
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