Lebanon’s Real Battle: Disarmament or Normalization?
By Gen. Charles Abi Nader
All the pressures exerted on Lebanon today—whether regional, international, or direct and indirect from “Israel”—and carried out by internal Lebanese parties, clearly indicate that their primary goal is the disarmament of Hezbollah. This effort takes many forms: political and diplomatic maneuvers, threats of force, promises of withdrawal and ending the occupation, reconstruction offers, and other approaches. The central issue, however, remains the same: achieving the complete disarmament of Hezbollah.
In practice, the objective of disarming Hezbollah is not limited to stripping it of weapons. The broader aim is to deprive Lebanon of its ability to deter the “Israeli” enemy, thereby granting “Israel” the freedom to violate Lebanese land, airspace, and sovereignty at will. If there were another way to achieve this objective without directly disarming Hezbollah, that path would certainly be taken—based on the calculation that weapons themselves are useless if those who control them lack the authority or resolve to employ them against the occupation. In that scenario, the weapons would lose both their value and their role, leaving no impact on the balance of confrontation with “Israel”.
Many regional examples illustrate this equation. Several Arab and Islamic states—such as Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and even Turkey—possess advanced and qualitative weaponry. Yet there is no objection or reservation from “Israel” or the United States regarding these arsenals. On the contrary, Western and “Israeli” commercial and strategic interests actively encourage such armament, with major Western defense companies—including Jewish-owned firms—constantly pursuing massive deals that supply these states with the most advanced weapons.
Therefore, the real problem for “Israel,” backed by the United States, is not the existence of weapons per se, but rather who holds the decision to use them against the occupation entity.
From this perspective, controlling the decision-making of states or groups capable of confronting the occupation becomes more critical than disarming them outright. Thus, in practical terms, the priority of imposing normalization with the occupation entity has come to outweigh the process of disarming the Resistance.
It is within this framework that the American strategy today—which is fundamentally the strategy of “Israel”—appears to have shifted focus: from pressing for Hezbollah’s disarmament toward imposing normalization on Lebanon.
The clearest manifestations of this strategy are as follows:
American and “Israeli” efforts—combined with real achievements—have complicated and rendered unfeasible any decision to disarm Hezbollah, by rejecting the logical sequence of events: ending the occupation, initiating reconstruction, and then addressing the weapons issue within the framework of national consensus and a comprehensive national defense strategy.
The hasty push to propose an economic zone in Lebanon’s southern border area before resolving the issues of occupation, reconstruction, and the return of displaced border village residents.
This economic zone proposal carries within it many elements of normalization with the enemy. Such a zone would be practically impossible to establish without commercial exchange or some form of shared management and investment. These arrangements, by their very nature, cannot take shape legally, commercially, or practically without being built on a foundation of political relations—which, in effect, is full-fledged “Normalization”.
