War on the Shia, Break with Taif
By Latifa Al-Husseini
Lebanon – In 1991, Speaker Nabih Berri—then Minister of State in the government of the late Prime Minister Omar Karami—called for the prompt implementation of Article 95 of the Constitution and the formation of a National Commission for the Abolition of Political Sectarianism. He considered the delay in this matter a contradiction to the spirit of the Taif Agreement.
His call came roughly one year after the signing of the National Reconciliation Accord, which in Clause “Z” of the first chapter on political reforms stated:
“The abolition of political sectarianism is a fundamental national goal that must be pursued according to a phased plan. The elected parliament, on a non-sectarian national basis, must take the necessary measures to achieve this goal, including forming a national commission headed by the President of the Republic and comprising the Speaker of Parliament, the Prime Minister, and political, intellectual, and social figures. Its mission is to study and propose means for abolishing political sectarianism, submit them to both Parliament and Cabinet, and follow up on the phased plan’s implementation.”
In 1999, Speaker Berri reiterated the importance of forming this constitutionally mandated commission during a meeting with a student delegation. In both instances, opposition arose to his serious proposal, with critics claiming it would disadvantage a sectarian group and alter the internal political balance—particularly with the Christian bloc, regardless of its varying orientations, being the likely loser in future elections.
The discussion never reached a conclusion nor materialized into a concrete plan adopted by the pillars of the state. Political factions instead agreed to safeguard the formula of national coexistence in line with the Taif Agreement’s stipulation that no authority is legitimate if it contradicts the Pact of National Coexistence.
Ignoring the Concerns of the Shia Community
Today, certain parties within the state and political arena are dealing with the Shia component in a way that contradicts the Document of National Coexistence—disregarding their concerns and fears about unfolding scenarios. Through marginalization and attempts at elimination, especially targeting their choice to resist the occupation, the authorities are sidelining Shiite participation in state and national decision-making.
From a socio-political perspective, any demand that undermines national coexistence—a principle the constitution seeks to protect—should not be pursued. The state must address the fears of groups who feel their existence and fate are threatened, providing them with official guarantees from within the state to ensure social balance among Lebanon’s sectarian components.
The State Turns Against Its Own Principles
While the official rhetoric still claims commitment to the Taif Agreement, reality tells another story:
- Denial of the Shiite community’s contributions and sacrifices in defending Lebanon and building the state.
- Exclusion from key decision-making processes.
- Treating Shiites and their representatives as though they have no role or national legitimacy—under the assumption that they are the “losers” in the region.
- Proceeding with surrendering Lebanon’s “power card”, provided by the Shia partner in the country—the Resistance.
- Marginalizing the Shia bloc’s views in Cabinet, particularly on the issue of exclusive arms possession, in violation of the principle of national coexistence.
- Ignoring the position of the Shia street, which firmly and openly supports the Resistance’s arms.
- Disregarding the losses suffered by hundreds of Shiite families whose sons—both civilians and Resistance fighters—were martyred during the ongoing “Israeli” aggression since September 2024.
- Neglecting reconstruction and compensation for thousands of affected and displaced Shiite families, with no serious governmental effort to address these needs.
- Restricting travel to holy shrines in Iran and Iraq, increasing hardships for Shias with business or personal ties in these countries.
- Confiscating the funds of Shia charitable associations linked to the Supreme Islamic Shia Council on weak pretexts—serving only to tighten restrictions on the community.
Replacing Shia with Sunnis
In parallel with the state’s ongoing campaign against the Shia, a paradox is being promoted that effectively undermines the Taif Agreement and the principle of national coexistence.
The argument goes that confessional balance in governance can be maintained simply by involving a segment of Muslims in decision-making—replacing Shia ministers with Sunnis, regardless of their popular legitimacy—so long as “Muslims and Christians” have voted on decisions proposed by foreign sponsor states.
By this logic, one might ask: could Maronite ministers be replaced by Catholic ones if they withdrew from a decision requiring national consensus?
Political Sociology and Protecting Communities
Political sociology has long examined how ethnic and religious groups can protect their existence and future—offering insights directly applicable to the Lebanese Shia case.
The risks faced by such groups include:
- Exclusion and Structural Discrimination: When a community is shut out of decision-making or systematically marginalized.
- Forced Assimilation: Imposing the dominant culture on all, erasing minority identity.
- Ethnic and Religious Conflict: When a group feels its very existence is threatened, leading to political or armed confrontation.
Protection mechanisms include granting institutional rights [such as parliamentary or administrative quotas], political empowerment, and genuine participation in shaping policies that affect the group’s interests.
Given Lebanon’s current trajectory, key questions emerge: Does the state truly value the rights of political groups that are integral partners in its structure? Does it still recognize the importance of preserving the delicate social fabric? Most importantly—will it realize the consequences of ignoring the Shiite community’s concerns for its existence and future?
